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Abstract 
We analyze the proportion of family business and its contribution to employment and gross 
domestic product (GDP). Our analysis adds to the literature by including all listed firms and 
by investigating a longer period than has heretofore been reported. The main contribution is to 
extend the analysis to include all firms in the economy using census data. Our study is 
devoted to the case of Sweden. Family business makes up half of the listed firms, and three 
quarters of all firms, accounting for one-fourth of total employment, and one-fifth of GDP. 
Their importance has increased during the period studied.  
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Family business has been treated as an anachronism, in traditional economics as well as by 
leading business historians. A conventional view was that family firms constituted one type of 
initial phase in enterprise development, followed by the public company phase. Family firms 
were seen as small and medium-sized, slow growing, and having “flat” organizational 
structures and internal succession patterns. It was assumed that family firms avoided stock-
market finance and thus relied to a large extent on self-financing or on local, often informal, 
credit sources. Their production technology was seen as backward and as less profitable than 
that in managerial firms. Today, these views are partly regarded as obsolete since empirical 
studies have shown that there are many large, dynamic, innovative, and profitable family 
firms in markets all over the world (Colli, 2003; Sjögren, 2006). 
 
However, the vast number of firms in the economy together with the fact that statistics does 
not recognize family firms has made it impossible in practice to study the degree of family 
ownership on a national level. By necessity, previous studies on the relative importance of 
family business have therefore been confined to listed firms, samples of firms, or case studies 
of firms, thus, excluding the majority of firms. In Sweden, only about 0.07 percent of firms 
are listed. Most family firms are indeed small and not listed, but there are also many large 
ones operating outside stock exchanges. The contribution of family firms to employment and 
gross domestic product (GDP) are therefore largely unknown. In this article we are dealing 
with five interrelated questions:  
1)  What is the proportion of family-controlled firms among listed firms?  
2)  What is the proportion of family-controlled firms among the total number of firms? 
3)  What is the share of family-controlled firms in terms of total employment?  
4)  What is the approximate value added of family-controlled firms in relation to GDP? 2 
 
5)  What is the dynamics of these ratios, i.e., the changes of family ownership and its 
economic impact over time? 
 
This is a pioneering study to examine the proportion and importance of family-controlled 
firms in the total economy. Our analysis concerns Sweden. It, firstly, adds to the literature by 
including all listed firms and, secondly, by studying a longer time period than has previously 
been done. The main contribution is, thirdly, to extend the analysis to include all firms in the 
economy using census data.  
 
We start our article by referring to the international research on the size of family ownership. 
Next we present our data, followed by our results. In the conclusions we collect our main 
findings. 
 
2. A comparative view of family business 
In the Chandlerian perspective, the rise of corporations since the late 19
th century epitomized 
a change from personal family capitalism to managerial capitalism. “No family or financial 
institution was large enough to staff the managerial hierarchies required to administer modern 
multiunit enterprises. Because the salaried managers developed specialized knowledge and 
because their enterprises were able to generate the funds necessary for expansion, they 
ultimately took over the top-level decision making from the owners or financiers or their 
representatives. /…/ They rarely had the time, the information or the depth of experience to 
propose alternative; they could veto proposals, but they could do little else” (Chandler & 
Deams, 1980, p. 13-14). A growing separation between ownership and control in the largest 
American corporations led to support for this view. It was confirmed in the late 1970s that the 
proportion of managerial enterprises among the 200 largest corporations had increased from 3 
 
50 percent in 1929 to more than 80 percent (Berle & Means, 1932; Herman, 1981). 
 
Hannah (1980) and Rose (1995) demonstrated that the development of the British big 
business in the early 1980s did not correspond very well to the American pattern. Soon after, 
it was shown that neither the Swedish experience seemed to fit the Chandlerian stage model 
(Glete, 1993; Ullenhag, 1993). Factors such as large firms and a large domestic market were 
likely to have been decisive in creating unique US conditions. Another explanation put 
forward was that the American scholars had been too strict in their definitions of a family 
firm.  
 
As discussed in La Porta et al. (1999) it is possible for a family to maintain a de facto control 
in a firm attaining a small minority shareholding. Control can be maintained through stable 
board membership, financial arrangements, or voting power enforced by law (such as 
differentiated voting rights). For instance, Donnelly (1964, p. 96) reports that 55 percent of 
the largest 175 US corporations in 1955 had close relatives or in-laws holding management 
jobs in the same company. Sheehan (1967) shows that family firms constituted about 150 out 
of the top 500 US corporations in the 1960s, using the definition of family ownership as 
holding at least 10 percent of the votes. When defining managerial control as 5 percent 
minimum capital in the hands of an individual, a family, or family members and inside or 
outside presence of one or more family members on the board of directors, 47 percent of the 
500 Fortune-ranked publicly owned American industrial enterprise groups fell under this 
definition in 1965 (Burch, 1972). Studies of the 500 largest US firms have shown a 
prevalence rate around 35 percent for the latest twenty years (Ward, 1987; Jetha, 1993). More 
recent studies of the US economy suggest that family firms represent between 4 and 20 
million firms in total, depending on the definitions of family involvement (Shanker & 4 
 
Astrachan, 1996; Colli, 2003, p. 17-18). 
 
In an international context La Porta et al. (1999) find that the shares of the large publicly-
traded firms are 20 percent for the United States and France, 10 percent for Germany, and 15 
percent for Spain, defining family firms as one owner or one family controlling at least 20 
percent of the votes. Regarding medium-sized publicly-traded firms, family business’s share 
is 10 percent in the United States, 50 percent in France, 40 percent in Germany, and 30 
percent in Spain. For Sweden, 45 percent of large and 60 percent of medium-sized publicly-
traded firms are family business in 1995 (Table 1).  5 
 
Table 1 Percentage of Companies Controlled by Families 
Sample (years studied)  Definition  Family firms (%)  Source 
Largest 175 US 
corporations (1955) 
Close relatives or in-laws 
holding management positions in 
the same company 
55%  Donnelly (1964) 
Top 500 US corporations 
(1960s) 
Families control > 10 % of the 
votes 
30%  Sheehan (1967) 
Fortune 500 (1965)  5% family ownership, 
representation on board, and 
multiple generations of 
involvement 
47%  Burch (1972) 
Fortune 500 (1987)  Founding family in top 
management position or on 
board 
35%  Ward (1987) 
Fortune 500 (1992)  Top executive is family member 
of descendant of founder 
37%  Jetha (1993) 
Business Week CEO 1000 
(1993) 
Top executive is family member 
of descendant of founder 
21%  McConaughy 
(1994) 
54,000 public companies in 
the US (1996)  
Under close family control  60%  Schanker & 
Astrachan (1996) 
20 largest publicly traded 
firms in various countries 
(1995) 
Families control > 20% of the 
votes  





La Porta et al. 
(1999) 
10 medium-sized publicly 
traded firms (1995) 
Families control > 20% of the 
votes 





La Porta et al. 
(1999) 
2,980 publicly traded 
corporations in nine East 
Asian countries (1996) 




Claessens et al. 
(2000) 
Top 250 firms on Paris 
Stock Exchange (1993-
1998) 
Families control > 10% of equity  57%   Blondel et al. 
(2002) 
5,232 publicly traded firms 
in 13 Western European 
countries (1996) 
Families control > 20% of the 
votes 





Faccio & Lang 
(2002) 
S&P 500 (1992-1999)  Members of founding family on 
board and hold shares in absence 
of outside blocs of > 5% 
32%  Anderson & Reeb 
(2003) 
S&P 500 (2003)  Founding family on board as 
executives or as significant 
owners  
35%  Weber et al. (2003) 
Top 100 corporations 
(1993). Top 5,000 
corporations for the case of 
the Netherlands. 
Definitions vary across the 
referred studies 
17% United States 
17% Germany 








Colli (2003, p. 16) refers to studies showing that family firms constitute 17 percent of the top 
100 corporations in the US and Germany, and represent 8 and 12 percent of GNP respectively 
at the turn of the twentieth century. In 1993, family-controlled firms made up for 46 percent 
of the major Dutch corporations, the proportion in the top 100 Swiss corporations amounted 
to one third, and for the top 100 Italian corporations the proportion of family firms is 
estimated to 50 percent.
1 
 
In a study of ownership and control of more than 5,000 firms in thirteen Western European 
countries in 1996, Faccio & Lang (2002) report about 44 percent to be family-controlled. 
Firms in France, Germany and Spain show a prevalence rate of family-controlled firms 
between 55 and 65 percent, while Sweden’s rate is estimated to 47 percent. Claessens et al. 
(2000) find family ownership to be highly concentrated in Asia. Their study covers close to 
3,000 firms in nine East Asian countries. With the exception of Japan, the share of family-
controlled firms ranges from 45 percent (Philippines) to 72 percent (Indonesia), applying a 20 
percent cutoff level for controlling voting rights.
2   
 
In a survey, Emling (2000) estimates the share of family firms among private firms with 
Swedish owners to about 55 percent in 1999. They count for almost 35 percent of 
employment and 29.5 percent of turnover within the same group. Firms with sales exceeding 
five million SEK and with five or more employees are included in the study.
3 All industries 
are covered. An individual or a family has to control over 50 percent of the company in order 
to be classified as a family firm. Moreover, Emling restricts the definition of a family firm 
                                                 
1 The studies referred by Colli (2003) are: Sluyterman (1997), Müller (1996), Barca et al. (1994), and Corbetta 
(1995). 
2 A longitudinal study of German companies comparing family-controlled and non-family controlled firms from 
1903 to 2003 also suggests that family ownership is an effective organizational structure outperforming non-
family firms in terms of operating (not stock market) performance. However, performance declined over the 
generations. It was also found that the families were slow to give up ownership, so that family control remained 
strong even after several generations (Ehrhardt et al., 2006). 
3 In 1999, 63 percent of all private firms had less than 5 employees according to our data.  7 
 
saying that at least one of the following requirements has to be fulfilled: i) present owner 
intends to transfer the business to a family or individual; ii) the business has existed in the 
present owners family for at least two generations; and iii) at least three representatives of the 
family are active in the business.  
 
Schenker & Astrachan (1996) acknowledge the lack of quantitative research on family 
business. There are a large number of qualitative studies whereas the quantitative 
contributions are to a great extent characterized by fairly unreliable statistics, not derived 
from primary research but from so called “Street Lore”. One explanation for the lack of 
quantitative research is that it is not until recently family firms have been identified and 
treated as a distinct entity. Another explanation put forward is the difficulties in detecting 
family business in the statistics. Our study directly responds to the pronounced wish for 
statistical accuracy both in definition and in coverage. 
  
3. Data  
Our study is based on two statistical sources: Firstly, census data produced by Statistics 
Sweden covering all firms in Sweden with employees.
4 Firms without employees that are run 
by self-employed are also included.
5 This data are available from 1993 to 2006, and includes, 
but do not identify, listed firms. Secondly, data on listed firms are then supplemented with the 
compilation “Owners and Power in Sweden’s Listed Companies”, available for the period 
1985 to 2008 (Sundqvist, 1985-2008).
6 Combining these statistical sources enable us to 
identify all family firms in the total economy. We apply three definitions of family business. 
Firstly, the more constrained 50 percent criterion, a firm in which a family controls at least 50 
                                                 
4 Statistics Sweden’s Microdata Online Access (MONA), based on Labour statistics from administrative sources 
(RAMS), and Longitudinal integration database for health insurance and labour market studies (LISA). 
5 People who have their principal occupation within their own company are regarded as self-employed. 
6 The standard work regarding ownership of listed firms.  8 
 
percent of the votes while being the largest owner, secondly, the 20 percent criterion, a firm in 
which a family controls at least 20 percent of the votes while being the largest owner, and 
thirdly, the more generous 5 percent criterion, a firm in which a family controls at least 5 
percent of the votes while being the largest owner. 
 
The total number of firms in the Swedish economy in 2006 that are carrying employees or are 
run by self-employed, make up for around 440,000. Listed firms amount to a few hundred per 
year. In total, our panel of data contains 5,496,177 observations.  
 
The small number of listed firms make it possible for a researcher or group of researchers – 
even though time consuming – to identify ownership. Sundqvist (1985-2008) categorizes 
owners into ownership spheres and we use his categorization when classifying listed firms as 
family firms. The large number of observations on non-listed firms make it impossible for an 
individual researcher or a group of researchers to classify them firm by firm, for a single year, 
and even more so for longer time periods. Instead we use information about legal forms in 
combination with the recognition of closely-held firms in the statistics. The three major legal 
forms are: sole-proprietorships (enskilda näringsidkare), partnerships (handelsbolag)
7 and 
incorporated businesses (aktiebolag). All sole-proprietorships are classified as family firms, 
since by law they can only be owned by a single individual.  
 
Previously, the problem has been to identify family firms among partnerships and non-listed 
incorporated firms. However, a large tax reform in the early 1990s made high labor incomes 
more heavily taxed than capital incomes. In order to prevent that highly taxed labor income 
was taxed at lower capital income rates, special rules for closely-held companies, applying to 
                                                 
7 This legal form also includes limited partnerships (kommanditbolag).  9 
 
partnerships and non-listed incorporations, were introduced. To be able to verify compliance 
with the rules, the Swedish Tax Authority has classified each partnership and non-listed 
incorporation in Sweden as closely-held or not.
8 Statistics Sweden has used this information 
to categorize firms in their registers.  
 
The principal rule concerning the definition of closely-held companies is that four or fewer 
owners have to control more than 50 percent of the votes in the firm (Swedish Tax Authority 
2008, part 3, ch. 9; SFS 1999: 1229). The rules apply to partnerships and incorporated firms, 
listed firms are excepted (SFS 1999: 1229, ch. 56 §3).
9 Family members are regarded as one 
ownership sphere. This means that the number of owners in a closely-held company can be 
greater than four (Swedish Tax Authority 2008, ch. 9, p. 206). Being closely-held, then, does 
not always imply that a firm should be classified as a family firm. For example, applying the 
definition that an ownership sphere has to control 20 percent of the votes excludes closely-
held companies having more than 5 owners if ownership is equally distributed, since the 
largest owner then controls less than 20 percent of the votes. Statistics Sweden keeps 
information over the number of owners of closely-held companies, but not of their votes. This 
paper responds to this by assuming that votes are equally distributed among the owners. That 
means that firms with more than two owners, more than five owners, and more than 20 
owners will be excluded from the definition when applying the 50 percent, 20 percent or 5 
percent criterion, respectively. In 2006, nine out of ten closely-held companies have one or 
two joint owners; 67 percent have one owner and 26 percent have two joint owners. 
Approximately 5 percent have three joint owners, 1.5 percent four joint owners, 0.5 percent 
five joint owners, and 0.5 percent have more than five joint owners. 
 
                                                 
8 In case owners dispute the classification, the court decides. 
9 Income from sole-proprietorships is taxed as labor income wherefore it is not necessary to prevent labor 
incomes from being taxed as capital incomes.   10 
 
Firms controlled by Swedish families who have emigrated are not identified in the statistics, 
nor are non-listed firms owned by a foundation that is controlled by a family, or firms active 
in Sweden owned by foreign families. The first category is represented by a number of well-
known companies, such as IKEA and Tetra Pak.
10 A large number of entrepreneurs emigrated 
and moved the domicile of their firms from Sweden in the 1970s and 1980s, often to the 
Netherlands, Great Britain and Switzerland, because of changes in regulations that had a 
negative impact on individual ownership, e.g., taxes could be confiscatory when firms were 
inherited (Lindkvist, 1990). The exodus still continues due to relatively high taxes on private 
ownership. The exclusion of these firms leads to an underestimation of employment in family 
business. IKEA alone employs approximately 9,000 people in Sweden in 2008.
11  
 
As a second category, foundations controlled by families, like the Wallenberg group, have 
increasingly invested in firms outside the stock market since the 1990s. We judge this to be a 
non-negligible effect, but there is little information on this. The third category has probably 
become much larger the last decades. Foreign ownership of Swedish firms has increased 
substantially, since the deregulation of Swedish capital markets in the late 1980s, making it 
easier for foreigners to invest in Sweden (e.g., Henrekson & Jakobsson, 2001). A recent 
example is the multinational heavy-truck producer Scania, with more than 13,000 employees 
in Sweden in 2008 (Scania, 2009). In 2008, Scania went from being controlled by the 
Swedish Wallenberg family to being controlled by the German Porsche/Piëch family.
 
Altogether, our dataset might therefore underestimate employment in family firms by 
hundreds of thousands of persons.
12  
                                                 
10 IKEA is controlled by Ingvar Kamprad and Tetra Pak is controlled by the Rausing family. 
11 Information from phone call to IKEA on April 30, 2009. 
12 100.000 employees correspond to 2 percent of total employment in 2006.  11 
 
 
4. Family business and employment  
4.1 Listed firms 
The share of family business stays at a relatively high level until 1990 according to all three 
definitions (Table 2). From then on, it declines: the share of family business according to the 
50 percent and the 20 percent criterion declines more than the share according to the 5 percent 
criterion. The share of family business according to the 50, 20 and 5 percent criterion is 
decreasing from 32, 61 and 72 percent in 1985 to 15, 52 and 69 percent, respectively, in 2008. 
The decline after 1990 might be partially explained by the deregulation of the Swedish 
financial market, carried out stepwise during the 1980s and completed in 1989, which made it 
easier for foreign actors to enter the Swedish market, exposing Swedish ownership to 
increased competition (Henrekson & Jakobsson, 2005). This indicates that the deregulation 
made it harder for family owners to remain in control of larger positions, though they have 
been able to maintain control of smaller ones.
13 
                                                 
13 The same tendencies have been observed regarding the industrial financial system (Sjögren & Kishida, 2009).  12 
 
Table 2 The Number and Share of Family Firms on the Swedish Stock Exchange, 1985-2008 
Year 
 
Total number of listed firms  Family business, 
50 percent control 
Family business, 
20 percent control 
Family business, 
5 percent control 
    N  (%)  N  (%)  N  (%) 
1985  251  81  32  154  61  180  72 
1986  246  98  40  171  70  188  76 
1987  239  71  30  146  61  168  70 
1988  257  99  39  163  63  178  69 
1989  239  97  41  157  66  172  72 
1990  243  105  43  164  67  182  75 
1991  219  85  39  141  64  149  68 
1992  202  74  37  122  60  129  64 
1993  185  64  35  105  57  111  60 
1994  194  60  31  101  52  113  58 
1995  215  69  32  118  55  134  62 
1996  212  62  29  120  57  137  65 
1997  245  67  27  139  57  160  65 
1998  286  68  24  157  55  190  66 
1999  316  76  24  178  56  206  65 
2000  324  67  21  170  52  217  67 
2001  334  58  17  170  51  225  67 
2002  332  64  19  169  51  223  67 
2003  325  68  21  172  53  220  68 
2004  301  59  20  158  52  211  70 
2005  291  52  18  154  53  204  70 
2006  295  52  18  150  51  202  68 
2007  294  47  16  146  50  201  68 
2008  299  45  15  154  52  207  69 
Note: Control refers to share of votes. 
Source: Sundqvist (1985-2008) and own calculations.  
 
These findings are in line with previous studies. In 1996, Faccio & Lang (2002) found 47 
percent of Swedish firms to be family-controlled according to the 20 percent criterion, while 
we find a somewhat higher share, 57 percent. Compared to other countries reported by Faccio 
& Lang (2000), our estimates for Sweden show a lower share than Germany and France (65 
percent), but a higher share than Spain and the Western Europe average (56 and 44 percent, 
respectively). Relating our findings to the ones reported for Sweden by La Porta et al. (1999) 
reveal that our estimate (55 percent) in 1995 is close to the 60 percent share reported for the 
medium-sized publicly-traded firms and a bit higher than the 45 percent share reported for the 
large publicly-traded firms. In comparison to other countries reported by La Porta et al. 
(1999), our estimate reveals a higher share than medium-sized firms in the United States (10 13 
 
percent), Germany (40 percent), France (50 percent), and Spain (30 percent).
14 Further 
comparisons, looking at both medium-sized and large firms, show that our estimate is close to 
the 50-60 percent share in Belgium, Greece, Israel, Australia, Italy and Portugal. Four 
countries reported by La Porta et al. (1999), Argentina, Hong Kong, Greece and Mexico, 
show a higher share than our estimate for Sweden. 
 
4.2 The whole economy 
The number of family firms in the whole economy has increased in absolute numbers as well 
as in proportion (Table 3). In 1993, 61 to 65 percent out of the total number of firms were 
family firms compared to 74 to 76 percent in 2006, irrespective of definition. According to the 
50 percent criterion, family business’s share of total employment has increased from 15 
percent in 1993 to 21 percent in 2006, and from 20 (21) percent to 25 (26) percent according 
to the 20 (5) percent criterion. During the thirteen year period, employment in family business 
has increased with more than 300,000. The increase in total employment during the same time 
period is approximately 550,000. Hence, family business corresponds to a significant part of 
the total increase in employment between 1993 and 2006. As for the year 2006, the family 
business share of 76 percent leaves 24 percent to other forms of ownership. A further analysis 
of these firms reveals that according to the 20 percent criterion, about 0.2 percent out of the 
total amount of firms in 2006 are owned by the central government, 0.3 percent by local 
government, i.e., municipalities, and 19.5 percent by private non-family owners. Remaining 4 
percent have owners that have not yet been classified by Statistic Sweden. Furthermore, their 
contribution to employment is: 9 percent for central government firms, 27 percent for local 
government firms, and 39 percent for private non-family firms. Firms not yet classified into 
ownership categories have negligible effect on employment, accounting for 0.4 percent of 
                                                 
14 The share of medium-sized firms reported in La Porta et al. (1999) is consistently higher than the share of large 
publicly traded firms, with the exception of the United States (20 percent).  14 
 
total employment.  
 
Table 3 Employment in Family Business in the Total Economy, Including Firms Listed on the 
Swedish Stock Exchange (thousands), 1993-2006 
   1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
  
                            
Total no. of firms  352  368  371  370  382  390  389  395  396  398  392  426  429  438 
Fam. bus. share, 50 % def. (%)  61  61  62  62  61  61  55  60  60  62  64  74  74  74 
Fam. bus. share, 20 % def. (%)  65  65  65  65  64  63  63  63  62  65  67  75  76  76 
Fam. bus. share, 5 % def. (%)  65  66  66  65  64  64  63  63  62  65  67  76  76  76 
                             
Total employment  3748  3800  3851  3828  3813  3930  3960  4063  4102  4147  4095  4173  4185  4291 
Fam. bus. share, 50 % def. (%)  15  15  15  14  14  14  13  13  13  14  14  21  21  21 
Fam. bus. share, 20 % def. (%)  20  21  21  20  20  19  19  18  18  19  20  25  26  25 
Fam. bus. share, 5 % def. (%)  21  23  22  21  21  20  20  19  18  19  20  26  27  26 
                               
No. of private firms  326  340  345  347  356  363  341  370  372  373  375  405  409  418 
Fam. bus. share, 50 % def. (%)  66  67  66  66  66  65  62  64  64  67  67  77  78  78 
Fam. bus. share, 20 % def. (%)  70  71  70  69  69  68  65  67  66  69  70  79  80  80 
Fam. bus. share, 5 % def. (%) 
71  71  70  69  69  68  66  67  66  70  70  80  80  80 
                             
Employment in private firms  2057  2123  2227  2227  2262  2371  2413  2567  2575  2581  2581  2653  2672  2747 
Fam. bus. share, 50 % def. (%)  27  27  26  25  24  23  21  21  21  22  23  32  33  32 
Fam. bus. share, 20 % def. (%)  37  37  35  34  34  32  31  28  28  30  31  40  40  39 
Fam. bus. share, 5 % def. (%)  38  41  37  36  35  33  33  30  29  31  32  41  42  40 
                             
Source: Sundqvist (1985-2008), Statistics Sweden, and own calculations.  
 
The figures take a leap in 2004 due to changes in methods in defining self-employment. As of 
2004, the statistics includes firms run by self-employed, that do not demonstrate a surplus. 
Before 2004, only self-employed that made a profit were included in the statistics. This 
change in definition added 64,840 family firms (Bjuggren et al., 2008), which corresponds to 
an increase in family business’s share of more than 5 percentage points in 2004 and around 4 
percentage points in the following two years. Extracting these firms results in a family 
business share of 71 percent in 2004 and 72 percent in 2005 and 2006, for both the 20 and the 
5 percent criteria. As regards the 50 percent criterion, the result is 69 percent in 2004 and 15 
 
2005, and 70 percent in 2006. Taking this into account, a comparison from 1993 to 2006 
reveals that the family business’s share of the total number of firms increases by seven (or 
eight for the 50 percent criterion) percentage points instead of eleven (thirteen for the 50 
percent criterion). The change in method also alters the family business’s share of 
employment, although only by one or two percentage points. Taking the method change into 
consideration, family business’s share of total employment is 19 (24) percent in 2004 and 
2006, and 20 (25) percent in 2005 according to the 50 (20) percent criterion, and 25 percent 
for all three years, according to the 5 percent criterion.   
 
Family business’s share of private firms amounts to about 70 percent in 1993 and about 80 
percent in 2006. Taking the method change into account, the share of family business lies 
around 73 (75 and 76) percent from 2004 to 2006 according to the 50 (20 and 5) percent 
criterion. This implies an increase in the share of family business with 5-7 percentage points 
from 1993 to 2006. The 62 percent share in 1999, according to the 50 percent criterion, is a bit 
higher than the 55 percent share estimated by Emling (2000). One plausible explanation is 
that the share of family business is larger among smaller firms, which are covered by our but 
not by Emling’s study.  
 
Family business’s share of private employment increases from 27 percent in 1993 to 32 
percent in 2006 according the 50 percent criterion. For both the 20 and 5 percent criteria the 
share changes from 38 percent in 1993 to 40 percent in 2006.
 Also here, taking the method 
change into account decreases the estimates with one or two percentage points. According to 
the 50 (5) percent criterion the altered share is 31 (40) percent in 2004 and in 2005, and 30 
(39) percent in 2006. According to the 20 percent criterion the altered share is 38 percent in 
2004 and in 2006, and 39 percent in 2005. Defining family business according to the 50, 20, 16 
 
or 5 percent criterion has only modest effect on the results. The family business’s share of 
private employment in 1999, 21, 31 and 33 percent respectively, is a little lower than the 35 
percent estimated by Emling (2000). This divergence may be explained by the fact that 
Emling’s study is based on a population sample, while our study is based on census data.  
 
5. Family business and GDP  
Statistics on value added is available in our database from 1997 and onwards. From 1997 to 
2003 the family business’s share of GDP according to the 50 percent criterion, lies between 9 
and 12 percent. In 2004 there is a leap to 16 percent, followed by 17 percent in 2005 and 16 
percent in 2006. As discussed earlier, the number of private firms increases in 2004 due to 
statistical changes, which probably explains the leap.
15 Family business’s share of GDP 
according to the 20 percent criterion lies between 15 and 18 percent from 1997 to 2003. 
Correspondingly there is a leap to 22 percent in 2004, followed by 22 percent in 2005 and 21 
percent in 2006. The share according to the 5 percent criterion is a little higher than for the 20 
percent criterion. The 5 percent criterion shows a two percentage point higher share in 1997 
and 2006, and a one percentage point higher share for the remaining years (with the exception 
of 2003). 
                                                 
15 Statistics Sweden only gives the number of firms and employees that are affected by this change, not the 
corresponding value added.   17 
 
 
Table 4 Family business’s share of GDP, and private value added, 1997-2006  
   1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Share of GDP                      
Fam. bus. 50 % def. (%)  10  9  9  9  10  11  12  16  17  16 
Fam. bus. 20 % def. (%)  16  17  18  15  16  17  18  22  22  21 
Fam. bus. 5 % def. (%)  18  18  19  16  17  18  18  23  23  22 
                     
Fam bus share of private value added                     
Fam. bus. 50 % def. (%)  17  16  15  16  17  19  19  26  27  25 
Fam. bus. 20 % def. (%)  29  28  30  24  26  28  28  35  35  33 
Fam. bus. 5 % def. (%)  33  30  32  26  27  29  29  37  37  34 
                     
Note: Current prices are used. 
Source: Sundqvist (1985-2008), Statistics Sweden and own calculations.  
 
These results are in accordance with the lower estimate of Astrachan & Schanker (1996), who 
estimate that family business stands for between 12 and 49 percent of GDP, depending on 
definition. For comparison, Colli (2003) finds that family business accounted for 8 percent of 
GNP in the United States and for 12 percent in Germany.  
 
Family business’s share of value added of private firms amounts to 17 percent in 1997, 
according to the 50 percent criterion, 29 percent according to the 20 percent criterion, and 33 
percent according to the 5 percent criterion. A decrease takes place in 1999-2000 when the 
share reduces to 15, 24 and 26 percent, respectively. In 2006, the shares were 25, 33, and 34 
percent, respectively. The development is overall a somewhat uneven increase from 17 to 25 
percent (50 percent criterion), 29 to 33 percent (20 percent criterion), and 33 to 34 percent (5 
percent criterion) during the studied time period. The development of family business’s share 
shows similar patterns regardless of definition. The largest deviation takes place between 
1997 and 1999, where the difference between the 50 and the 5 percent criteria amounts to 14-
17 percentage points. 18 
 
 
At first glance, the fact that family business shows a somewhat lower share of GDP and of 
private value added than of total and private employment may suggest a lower productivity in 
family firms. Such a conclusion will be too hasty because capital intensity and total factor 
productivity in different firms and industries has to be taken into account. That analysis is 
beyond the scope of this study, however.  
 
6. Concluding remark  
This study shows that family business accounts for a substantial share of employment and 
GDP. Their relevance stands in contrast to the historical foretelling by Chandler and others. 
Given the contribution to employment and GDP, family business certainly deserves our 
further attention. In order to capture the economic contribution of family business it is crucial 
to first be able to identify family firms in the statistics. By using statistics extracted from tax 
registers we are able to identify all closely-held firms in the Swedish economy. This allows us 
to deduce family business based on the number of owners and the legal form of the firm. Data 
on listed firms is then added, resulting in a dataset containing 5.5 million observations 
covering the years 1993 to 2006. As regards value added, data are available from 1997 to 
2006. Data on listed firms cover the years 1985 to 2008.  
 
Looking at the firms on the Swedish stock exchange, the share of family business amounts to 
32, 61 and 72 percent respectively in 1985, applying the definition that an owner, or family, 
controls either 50, 20 or 5 percent of the votes. The share decreases to 18 percent in 2006 
using the 50 percent criterion, 51 percent using the 20 percent criterion and to 69 percent 
using the 5 percent criterion. The results encompassing the entire economy reveal a larger 
presence of family business. In 2006, the share equals about 75 percent, regardless of 19 
 
definition. In comparison to earlier research, this is a rather high proportion. In 2006, the 
contribution of family business to employment is about one fifth and about one sixth to GDP, 
according to the 50 percent criterion. As regards the 20 percent and the 5 percent criteria, the 
contribution of family business to employment is about one fourth and about one fifth to GDP 
in 2006. A more dynamic view over time exposes an increase in family business’s share of 
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